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Abstract—Formal methods have provided approaches for in-
vestigating software engineering fundamentals and also have high
potential to improve current practices in dependability assurance.
In this article, we summarise known strengths and weaknesses of
formal methods. From the perspective of the assurance of robots
and autonomous systems (RAS), we highlight new opportunities
for integrated formal methods and identify threats to their
adoption to be mitigated. Based on these opportunities and
threats, we develop an agenda for fundamental and empirical
research on integrated formal methods and for successful transfer
of validated research to RAS assurance. Furthermore, we outline
our expectations on useful outcomes of such an agenda.
Index Terms—Formal methods, strengths, weaknesses, op-
portunities, threats, SWOT, challenges, integration, unification,
research agenda.
NOMENCLATURE
(A)SIL (Automotive) Safety Integrity Level
DA Dependability Assurance
DSL Domain-Specific Language
FI Formal Inspection
FM Formal Method
iFM integrated Formal Method
MBD Model-Based Development
MDE Model-Driven Engineering
ML Machine Learning
QA Quality Assurance
RAS Robots and Autonomous Systems
RE Requirements Engineering
RCA Root Cause Analysis
SACM Structured Assurance Case Meta-Model
SMT Satisfiability Modulo Theory
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
UTP Unifying Theories of Programming
I. INTRODUCTION
A plethora of difficulties in software practice and mo-
mentous software faults have been continuously delivering
reasons to believe that a significantly more rigorous disci-
pline of software engineering is needed. Researchers such as
Neumann [1] have collected plenty of anecdotal evidence on
software-related risks substantiating this belief.
In dependable systems engineering, researchers have turned
this belief into one of their working hypotheses and contributed
formalisms, techniques, and tools to increase the rigour in en-
gineering workflows. Examples of activities where formalisms
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have been brought to bear include requirements engineer-
ing (e.g. [2]), architecture design, test-driven development,
program synthesis, and testing, to name a few. The field of
formal methods was born and has been an active research
area for many decades. FMs have served as a powerful tool
for theoretical researchers and as a paradigm to be adopted
by practitioners and, hence, to be further investigated by
applied researchers. Applications of these methods showed
their strengths but also their weaknesses.
Recently, we can observe this plethora of difficulties with
robots and autonomous systems (RAS). Such systems are going
to be more broadly deployed in society, therefore, increasing
their level of safety criticality [3]. Hence, their regulatory
acceptance requires assurance cases with comprehensible and
indefeasible safety arguments. However, assurance cases as-
sociated with standards like IEC 61508 and DO-178C can be
laborious to create, complicated to maintain and evolve, and
must be rigorously checked by the evaluation process to ensure
that all obligations are met and confidence in the arguments
is achieved [4], [5].
In spite of the weaknesses of current FMs, and encouraged
by their strengths, we believe that the integration of formal
methods can reduce critical deficits observable in dependable
systems engineering. Farrell et al. [6] state that “there is
currently no general framework integrating formal methods for
robotic systems.” The authors highlight the use of what are
called integrated formal methods (iFM)1 in the construction
of assurance cases and the production of evidence as a key
opportunity to meet current RAS challenges. Particularly,
machine-checked assurance cases can greatly increase confi-
dence in the sufficiency of assurance cases, and also aid in
their maintenance and evolution through modularisation of
arguments and evidence. Integration of formal methods, in
particular modern virtual prototyping and hybrid verification
tools, can improve the automation of the evidence gathering
process, and highlight potential problems when an assurance
case changes.
A. Contribution
With this work, we investigate the potentials for the wider
adoption of iFMs in dependable systems engineering, taking
RAS as a recent opportunity for making progress with iFM
research and for its successful transfer into practice.
We carry through an analysis of strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats to the use of iFMs in the practical
assurance of robots and autonomous systems. For this analysis,
we surveyed literature on FM research transfer and application
1We reuse the term from the homonymous conference series [7].
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Fig. 1. RAS assurance as an opportunity for the wider adoption of iFMs in
dependable systems practice
and on dependable systems engineering. Figure 1 depicts how
we deduce a research agenda for iFMs with a focus on RAS
assurance from a research agenda for FMs in dependable
systems engineering.
From the strengths, we see in recent research, and from the
opportunities in current RAS assurance, we argue why RAS
assurance—an instance of assurance in dependable systems
engineering (cf. Figure 1)—is a key opportunity for making
substantial iFM research progress. Throughout this work, we
indicate how iFMs can meet typical challenges in dependabil-
ity assurance that also apply to RAS assurance.
From the weaknesses, we observe in recent research, and
from the threats general FM research transfer is exposed to,
we derive the directions of foundational and empirical research
to be taken to transfer iFMs to RAS assurance and use them
to their maximum benefit.
Our analysis 1) elaborates on the analysis and conclusions
of Hoare et al. [8], 2) extends their suggestions with regard to
FM experimentation and empirical evidence of effectiveness
focusing on collaboration between FM research and prac-
titioners, and 3) develops a specific research and research
transfer roadmap within the application domain of robots and
autonomous systems.
B. Overview
We provide some background including terminology (Sec-
tion II-A) and related work (Section II-B) in the following.
Then, we carry through an analysis of strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats of iFMs for RAS assurance (Sec-
tions III and IV). Based on this analysis, we formulate our
hypotheses (Section VI), pose research questions based on
this hypotheses, derive a research agenda, and specify the
outcomes we expect from this agenda (Section VII).
II. BACKGROUND
A. Terminology
For sake of clarity among readers of different provenance,
we restrict the meaning of some terms we use in the following
and introduce convenient abbreviations.
We view robots and autonomous systems as both dependable
systems and highly automated machines capable of achieving
a variety of complex tasks in support of humans. We can
consider such systems looking at four layers: the plant or
process composed of the operational environment and the
machine; the machine itself; the machine’s controller, and the
software embedded into this controller. We treat “embedded
system” and “embedded software” as synonyms. Machine,
controller, and software can be distributed.
By dependable systems engineering, we refer to error-
avoidance and error-detection activities in control system and
embedded software development (e.g. according to the V-
model). Avizienis et al. [9] provide a comprehensive termi-
nology and an overview of the assessment and handling of
a variety of faults, errors, and failures. For critical systems,
such activities are expected to be explicit (e.g. traceable,
documented), to employ best practices (e.g. design patterns),
and to be driven by reasonably qualified personnel (e.g. well-
trained and experienced engineers or programmers).
In the applications we consider, the need for dependability
arises from the embedding of software into a cyber-physical
context (i.e., an electronic execution platform, a physical
process to be controlled, other systems or human users to
interact with). Dependability assurance (DA, or assurance
for short) encompasses the usually cross-disciplinary task of
providing evidence for an assurance case (e.g. safety, security,
reliability) for a system in a specific operational context [10].
By formal methods, we refer to the use of formal (i.e., math-
ematically precise and unambiguous) modelling languages to
describe system elements, such as software, hardware com-
ponents, and the environment, and to subject these models to
analysis, the results of which are targeted at DA [11], [12].
FMs always require the use of both formal syntax and formal
semantics (i.e., the mapping of syntax into a mathematical
structure). Semantics that allow the verification of refinement
or conformance across different FMs are said to be unify-
ing [13], [14]. Integrated formal methods (iFMs) allow the
coordinated application of several potentially heterogeneous
formal methods, supported by several interrelated layers of
formal semantics [15], [16].
FMs stand in contrast to informal methods, which employ
artefacts without a formal syntax or semantics, such as natural
language descriptions and requirements. In the gap between
informal methods and FMs there is also a variety of semi-
formal methods, including languages like UML and SysML,
whose syntax and semantics have frequently been subject of
formalisation in research (e.g. [17], [18], [19], [20]).
FM-based tools represent software for the automation of
modelling and reasoning along with the use of a FM. Through
model-based development (MBD) and model-driven engineer-
ing (MDE), FM-based tools have been successfully applied in
dependable systems projects [21], [22].2
We speak of applied or practical FMs to signify successful
applications of FMs in a practical context, for example, to
develop embedded control software deployed in a commercial
product marketed by an industrial company. We consider the
use of FMs in research projects still as FM research. Empirical
2The SCADE Design Verifier (http://www.esterel-technologies.com) and
the seL4 microkernel (http://sel4.systems) represent good although less recent
examples.
3FM research investigates practical FMs, for example, using
surveys, case studies, or controlled field experiments [23].
We speak of FM transfer if FM research is transferred into
practice with the aim to effectively apply and practice FMs.
FM transfer, as discussed below, is crucial for strong empirical
FM research and progress of FM research in the long term.
B. Related Work
Many researchers have suggested that FMs will, in one way
or another, play a key role in mastering the mentioned difficul-
ties and in achieving the desired guarantees (e.g. dependability,
security, performance) of future critical systems.
Expecting an increased use of FMs to solve practical
challenges in the mid 1990s, Clarke and Wing [11] suggested
FM integration, tool development, and continuous specialist
training to foster successful FM transfer to practice.
In 2000, Van Lamsweerde [24] observes a growing number
of FM success stories in requirements engineering. Evaluating
several FM paradigms, he outlines weaknesses (e.g. isolation
of languages, poor guidance) to be compensated and chal-
lenges to be met towards effective FM use, particularly, their
integration into multi-paradigm specification languages.
In the mid 2000s, Hinchey et al. [25] spot a decline of inter-
net software dependability in the context of an increased level
of concurrency in such software systems. Their observation is
backed by an earlier comparative software/hardware depend-
ability discussion by Gray and Brewer [26]. Hinchey et al.
highlight achievements in FM automation enabling an in-
creased use of lightweight FMs in “software engineers’ usual
development environments.” Furthermore, they stress the abil-
ity to use several FMs in a combined manner to verify
distributed (embedded) systems, avoid errors and, hence, stop
the decline of software dependability.
Hoare et al. [8] issue the manifesto of the “Verified Software
Initiative.” Based on a consensus of strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats in the software engineering commu-
nity, they propose a long-term international “research program
towards the construction of error-free software systems.”
Outlining an agenda for FM transfer, Jhala et al. [27] raise
the need for improved benchmarks, metrics, and infrastructure
for experimental evaluation, the need for revised teaching
and training curricula, and the need for research communities
interested in engaging with practitioners and working on ways
to scale FMs up to large systems and to increase the usability
of FMs. The authors specify several applications with great
opportunities for FM transfer.
The applied researchers and practitioners interviewed by
Schaffer and Voas [28] convey an optimistic picture of
FM adoption in practice, highlighting the potentials to im-
prove IT security, particularly, in cyber-physical systems.
Chong et al. [29] share the view that FMs are the most
promising approach towards acceptably dependable and secure
systems. The challenges they list for the security domain
are similar to the challenges we perceive in RAS assurance:
FM integration, sound abstraction techniques, compositional
guarantees, sufficient evidence for sustainable transfer.
With their survey of FMs for RAS verification, Luckcuck
et al. [30] identify difficulties of applying FMs in the robotics
domain and summarise research results and their limitations.
They conclude (i) that formalisation remains the most critical
and most difficult task, (i) that the surveyed approaches do not
provide “sufficient evidence for public trust and certification,”
and (i) that iFMs would be highly desirable if the current
lack of translations between the most relevant of the surveyed
techniques (e.g. model checking) could be overcome. Our
survey complements their observations by further analysis of
the lack of unification of iFMs and the missing empirical
evidence for the effectiveness of FMs and iFMs as well as
by a corresponding research roadmap.
III. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF FORMAL
METHODS FOR DEPENDABILITY ASSURANCE
Following the guidelines for SWOT analyses in [31], we
provide an overview of Strengths and Weaknesses of FMs.
A. Reputation, Education, and Training
The question “Are formal methods essential, or even useful,
or are they just an intellectual exercise that gets in the
way of building real-world systems?” in the guest editor’s
introduction of the “50 Years of Software Engineering” IEEE
Software special theme issue [32] invites us to deliberate on
this topic and summarise its highlights. Applied researchers
have raised the issue of limited effectiveness and productivity
of FMs, particularly, in large practical systems with changing
requirements [33], [34]. FMs are known to be difficult to
apply in practice, and bad communication between theorists
and practitioners sustains the issue that FMs are taught but
rarely applied [33]. In contrast, they are considered to
have significant potential to cope with the toughest recent
engineering problems: certifiable RAS assurance [6].
Since the beginning of software engineering there has
been a controversial debate on the usefulness of FMs. FMs
are well-suited to substantially improve modelling precision,
requirements clarity, and verification confidence. FM appli-
cations in requirements engineering such as the “Software
Cost Reduction” toolset [35] even carry the hypothesis of FM
cost-effectiveness in its name. Already in the 1990s, FM
researchers have started to examine FM usefulness with the
aim to respond to critical observations of practitioners [36],
[37], [38], [39], [40]. Some of these efforts culminated in
empirical studies [41], [42] suggesting high error detection
effectiveness, though with some controversy also caused by
employed research designs [43], [44].
Jones and Bonsignour [45, Sec. 3.2, Tab. 3.2] suggest that
the combination of formal3 inspections, static analysis, and
formal testing has been the best approach to defect prevention
with up to 99% of accumulated defect removal efficiency. FMs
can be seen as a particularly rigorous and systematic form of
this approach, though even less often applied. In Appendix A,
we make a brief excursion to the relationship between FMs and
formal inspection and try to estimate the size of the population
of FM users.
From two larger surveys, one in the early 1990s [46] and
another one in the late 2000s [21], [22], we obtain a more
3Here, the word “formal” does not imply the use of formal semantics.
4comprehensive picture of the typical advantages of FM use
and barriers to FM adoption as seen by practitioners and
practical FM researchers. In two recent surveys [47], [48],
[49], we made two, not necessarily surprising but empirically
supported, observations underpinning the main findings of the
former studies: many practitioners view FMs as promising
instruments with high potential, and would use these instru-
ments to their maximum benefit, whether directly or through
FM-based tools. However, the beneficial use of FMs is still
hindered by severe obstacles (e.g. hard to learn, difficult to
integrate in existing processes, too expensive, fallacy of invalid
abstractions, difficult to maintain).
B. Transfer Efforts
FMs can be effective in two ways: First, they can reduce
cost in incremental system design when being used as a
prototyping technique, as formal test-driven development, or
by crafting module assertions prior to programming. Once an
initial formalisation (particularly, invariants) is available, it is
argued for families of similar systems that, from the second
or third application (e.g. iteration or increment) onwards, the
benefit of having the formalisation outperforms the cumulative
effort to maintain the formalisation up to an order of magni-
tude [50], [51]. Second, FMs can be relatively easily employed
through knowledge extraction from existing artefacts and using
automated tools such as, for example, formal or model-based
post-facto testing tools or post-facto use of code assertion
checkers [52], [53]. However, the second way of utilising
FMs is known to be more compatible with everyday software
practice.
Achievements collected in [54], [55], [56] show that many
researchers have been actively working towards successful FM
transfer. Moreover, researchers experienced in particular FMs
draw positive conclusions from FM applications, especially,
in scaling FMs through adequate tool support for continuous
reasoning in agile software development [57], [58]. Other
researchers report about progress in theorem proving of system
software of industrial size (e.g. [59]) and about FM-based tools
for practical use (e.g. [22], [60], [53]).
Furthermore, MBD and MDE have a history of wrapping
FMs into software tools to make access to formalisms easier
and to help automating tedious tasks via domain-specific
languages (DSL) and visual notations.
Static (program) analysis is another branch where tool-
supported FMs have been practically used successfully (e.g.
[53]). However, by far not all static analysis tools are based
on FMs and many of these tools are known to be exposed
to the problem of reduced effectiveness because of high false-
positive rates, particularly, if occasionally complex settings are
not perfectly adjusted to the corresponding project [61].
Furthermore, the concolic testing technique [62], a post-
facto FM, has seen multiple successes in industry [63], [64].
It exercises all possible execution paths of a program through
systematic permutation of a sequence of branch conditions
inferred by an instrumented concrete execution. It uses these
symbolic execution paths and SMT solving to obtain a series
of inputs that exercise the full range of program paths. It
does not depend on a pre-defined model of the program, but
effectively infers one based on the branch conditions. It can
therefore readily be used on existing program developments,
and has notably been used by Samsung for verification of their
flash storage platform software [63]. Indeed, it is a belief of
the authors of this latter work that post-facto methods provide
greater opportunities for adoption of FMs into industry.
C. Evidence of Effectiveness
Whichever of these two directions is taken, strong evidence
for the efficacy of FMs in practice is still scarce (e.g. [42]) and
more anecdotal (e.g. [54], [56], [55], [28]), rarely drawn from
comparative studies (e.g. [41], [42]), often primarily conducted
in research labs (e.g. [65], [66]), or not recent enough to reflect
latest achievements in verification tool research (e.g. [67]).
We observe that a large fraction of empirical evidence for FM
effectiveness can be classified as level 6 or 7 according to [23,
Tab. 2], that is, too weak to draw effective conclusions.
Researchers from the software engineering measurement
community [45, Sec. 4.4, p. 220] support this observation by
stating that “there is very little empirical data on several topics
that need to be well understood if proofs of correctness are to
become useful tools for professional software development as
opposed to academic experiments.”
Graydon [68] observes this lack of evidence of FM
effectiveness in assurance argumentation. More generally,
Rae et al. [69] notice insufficiently evaluated safety research.
About 86% of works lack guidance to reproduce results,
hence, forming a barrier to the advancement of safety practice.
Although their study is limited to one conference series, it
indicates deficiencies in the evaluation of DA research.
Overall, it is important to understand that the mentioned
lack of evidence and successful transfers constitutes great
opportunities for successful FM research and transfer and not
necessarily risks of failure.
D. Expressivity
An often quoted weakness of MBD when applied to robotics
is the “reality gap” [70], [71] that can exist between a
naively constructed model and its corresponding real-world
artefact. According to [70], over-reliance on simulation to
test behaviour using naive and insufficiently validated robot
models can lead to effort being applied to solving problems
that do not exist in the real world. Worse, programs for robotic
controllers developed in a model-based setting may fail when
executed on real-world hardware, because “it is very hard to
simulate the actual dynamics of the real-world” [70]. This
problem is not only true of simulation, but any form of model-
based analysis, including FMs.
The fundamental problem here is that it is impossible to
model the behaviour of any physical entity precisely [72],
unless we replicate the original. Moreover, as models become
more detailed, their utility decreases and they can become
just as difficult to comprehend and analyse as their real-
world counterparts, an observation highlighted by the famous
paradox of Bonini [73]. Nevertheless, as statistician George
Box said “all models are wrong but some are useful” [74]: we
5must evaluate a model not upon how “correct” it is, or how
much detail it contains, but on how informative it is. According
to [72], the antidote is not to abandon the use of models,
but to recognise their inherent limitations and strengths, and
apply them intelligently to reasoning about a specific problem.
This means selecting appropriate modelling paradigms that
enable specification of behaviour at a sufficiently detailed level
of abstraction, and using the resulting models to guide the
engineering process, with iteration where necessary.
E. Integration and Coordination
Modelling notations usually employ a particular paradigm
to abstract the behaviour of the real-world. For example,
the state-based paradigm, employed by FMs like Z, B, and
refinement calculus, considers how the internal state of a
system evolves, whilst the event-driven paradigm, employed
in process calculi like CSP, CCS, and π-calculus, considers
how behaviour may be influenced by external interactions.
Consequently, individual formal methods are usually limited
to considering only certain aspects or views of a system’s
behaviour [75], [76], which can limit their effectiveness when
used in isolation. Many researchers have therefore sought to
overcome this weakness by FM integration [75], [77], [76].
In their FM summary, Clarke and Wing [11] also stress the
demand of FM integration.
The 1990s saw a large number of works in the direction
of semantic unification and method integration [75], [77].
Theoretical foundations were provided by Hehner, in his
seminal work on semantic unification using the “programs-
as-predicates” approach [78], [79] and comparative seman-
tics [80]. At the same time, refinement calculi were being
developed [81], [82], [83], that would underlie the work on
linking heterogeneous notations through abstraction. Mean-
while, Woodcock and Morgan [84] explored the integration of
state- and event-based modelling using weakest preconditions,
and several other works on this topic followed [85], [86], [87].
Hoare proposed a unified theory of programming [88] that
links together the three semantic styles: denotational, opera-
tional, and algebraic. These developments culminated in Hoare
and He’s Unifying Theories of Programming [13] (UTP), a
general framework for integration of semantically heteroge-
neous notations by application of Hehner’s approach [89] to
the formalisation of a catalogue of computational paradigms,
with links between them formalised using Galois connections.
This framework enabled a definitive solution to the integra-
tion of states and events, along with other computational
paradigms, in the Circus language family [90], [91], [92].
Another result of these developments was a number of
seminal works on FM integration [75], [77], [76]. Paige, taking
input from earlier work on systematic method integration [93],
defined a generic “meta-method” that aimed at integration
of several formal and semiformal methods using notational
translations with a common predicative semantic foundation,
which builds on Hehner’s work [79]. Meanwhile, Galloway
and Stoddart [77], building on their previous work [86],
likewise proposed the creation of hybrid FMs with a multi-
paradigm approach. Moreover, Broy proposed that FMs should
be integrated into the traditional V-method with common
semantic foundations to link the various models and artefacts
across development steps [76].
These diverse efforts eventually led to the founding of
the Integrated Formal Methods (iFM) conference series in
1999 [7], with the aim of developing theoretical founda-
tions for “combining behavioural and state-based formalisms”.
For the second iteration of the iFM conference [15], the
scope broadened to consider all the different aspects of FM
integration, including semantic integration, traceability, tool
integration, and refinement. A few years later, a conference
series was also established for UTP [94], with the aim of
continuing to develop unifying semantics for diverse notations
within the UTP framework.
However, there is as yet no agreed and general methodology
for integrating FMs that could be applied to RAS [6]. Overall,
integration is of particular pertinence to RASs, since they are
multi-layered systems possessing a high degree of semantic
heterogeneity. As Farrell et al. [6] state, they “can be variously
categorised as embedded, cyber-physical, real-time, hybrid,
adaptive and even autonomous systems, with a typical robotic
system being likely to contain all of these aspects.” When
we consider RAS, we must consider advanced computational
paradigms like real-time, hybrid computation with differential
equations, probability, and rigid body dynamics. This implies
the use of several different modelling languages and paradigms
to describe the different aspects, and therefore a variety of
analysis techniques to assure properties of the overall system.
Assurance of autonomous systems will certainly therefore
require iFMs [6]. Figure 1 summarises this relationship.
IV. OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTEGRATED FORMAL METHODS
This section continues with the “environmental analysis”
part of our SWOT analysis. Several key opportunities for
the transfer of iFMs arise from ongoing challenges in DA,
particularly, in RAS assurance and from looking at what
other disciplines do to cope with similar challenges. In the
following, we describe four such opportunities.
A. The Desire for Early Removal of Severe Errors
Summarising major challenges in automotive systems en-
gineering in 2006, Broy [95, p. 39] indicated that practised
modelling languages are not formalised and the desired bene-
fits cannot be achieved from semi-formal languages. Moreover,
software engineering is not well integrated with core con-
trol and mechanical engineering processes. Domain engineers
would produce software/hardware sub-systems and mechanical
sub-assemblies in undesirable isolation. Broy referred to a lack
of iFMs for overall architecture verification.
Has the situation changed since then? Liebel et al. [96]
report on significant drawbacks of model-centric development
in embedded software practice (e.g. based on UML/SysML) if
methods and tools are not well integrated or trained personnel
is missing. Likely, Broy’s criticism remains in contemporary
automatic vehicle engineering and assurance practice. In fact,
he has a recent, clearly negative, but not pessimistic answer to
6this question [97]. Moreover, this view is shared by the Auton-
omy Assurance International Programme’s discussion of assur-
ance barriers,4 that is, current challenges in the assurance of
RAS applications. These barriers (e.g. validation, verification,
risk acceptance, simulation, human-robot interaction) might
be addressed by formal engineering models and calculations
based on such models to be used as evidence in corresponding
assurance cases.
A specific opportunity for the use of formal methods
in (through-life) dependability assurance lies in model-based
assurance [98], [99], which uses models of system elements
to form the structure of an assurance case. The Structured As-
surance Case Meta-Model (SACM)5 represents a standardised
DSL suitable for integrating system-level assurance evidence
and, thus, from a specific branch of MDE.
Leading voices from applied software engineering research
keep mentioning the role of FMs as a key technology to
master upcoming challenges in assuring critical software sys-
tems [100]. A round table about the adoption of FMs in IT
security [28] positively evaluates their overall suitability, the
combination of FMs with testing, and the achievements in FM
automation. The panellists notice some limitations of FMs
in short-time-to-market projects and in detecting unknown
vulnerabilities as well as shortcomings in FM training and
adoption in practice.
However, even for mission-critical systems, high costs from
late defect removal and long defect repair cycles [45] as well
as dangerous and fatal6 incidents indicate that assurance in
some areas is still driven by practices failing to assist RAS
engineers in overcoming their challenges.
Moreover, Neumann, an observer of a multitude of com-
puting risks, states that “the needs for better safety, reliability,
security, privacy, and system integrity that I highlighted 24
years ago in my book, Computer-Related Risks, are still with
us in one form or another today” [101], [102], [103].
For example, artificial intelligence software, particularly,
machine learning (ML) components have been developed at a
high pace and used in many non-critical applications. Recently,
ML components are increasingly deployed in critical domains.
For verification and error removal, such software has to be
transparent and explainable. Preferring verifiable algorithms
to heuristics, Parnas [104] reminds of the corresponding
engineering principle: “We cannot trust a device unless we
know how it works.” One way to follow this principle and
establish transparency is to reverse engineer (i.e., to decide)
the functionality of an ML component even if this is not
possible in general [105]. FMs can help extract knowledge
and reverse engineer abstractions of ML systems to improve
explainability. Obviously, we might then ask to which extent
the reverse engineered and verified functionality serves as a
substitute for the original ML component.
These anecdotes make it reasonable to question current
assurance practice. Seen through the eyes of assurance, these
4See https://www.york.ac.uk/assuring-autonomy/body-of-knowledge/ .
5See https://www.omg.org/spec/SACM/About-SACM/.
6For example, the fatal accident involv-
ing a Tesla advanced driving assistance system,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jun/07/tesla-fatal-crash-silicon-valley-autopilot-mode-report.
anecdotes suggest that we might again be facing a dependable
software engineering crisis similar to the one from the late
1960s [97], [106].
Opportunity 1: We as researchers and practitioners
could really learn from this crisis and improve the way we
correctly engineer and certify highly automated systems.
B. The Desire to Learn From Accidents and Their Root Causes
In the title of Section IV-A, the word “severe” refers to
the negative consequences potentially caused by errors we
want to remove using iFMs. The more severe the potential
consequences of an error, the more critical is its early removal.
The usefulness of iFMs, thus, positively correlates with their
support in the removal of critical errors. However, the estima-
tion of severity often also requires the careful study of past
field incidents [107].
We speak of field incidents to refer to significant operational
events in the field (i.e., in the environment where a technical
system is operated), undesired because of their safety risks and
their severe harmful consequences. Field incidents typically
range from minor incidents to major accidents. It is important
to separate the observed effect, the field incident, from its
causes or, more precisely, from the causal chains of events
leading to the observed effect. Hence, this analysis depends
on the considered system perimeter (see, e.g. [9]). Depending
on the possibilities of observation and the depth pursued in
a root cause analysis (RCA), a conclusion on a possible
cause can result in any combination of, for example, overall
system failure, human error, adverse environmental condition,
hardware fault, software fault, or specification error.7
There are many databases about field incidents, some are
comprehensive including RCA, others are less detailed, and
some are confidential, depending on the regulations in the
corresponding application domain or industry sector. Based
on such databases, accident research, insurance, and consumer
institutions occasionally provide brief root cause statistics
together with their accident statistics (e.g. [108]).8
Accident statistics allow certain predictions of the safety
of systems and their operation, for example, whether risk has
been and will be acceptably low. Such statistics are also used
in estimations of the amount of field testing necessary9 to
sufficiently reduce risk [110].
However, without the analysis of accident causes, such
statistics are of little use in decisions on measures for accident
prevention [111], for example, on improvements of engineer-
ing processes, methods (e.g. iFMs), and technologies (e.g.
iFM tools) used to build these systems. For this, we require
deep RCA and statistics that relate error removal by iFMs and
incident root causes. To this extent, deep RCA is crucial for
the investigation of iFM effectiveness.
7Specification errors are also called development failures [9] and can be
seen as flaws in the process of requirements validation.
8Apart from the databases mentioned in Section II, further examples of
such databases are mentioned in [109, Sec. 1.1].
9For example, according to “As Low As Reasonably
Practicable” or “So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable.” See
http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpcheck.htm: “Something is reasonably
practicable unless its c s s are grossly disproportionate to the benefits.”
7To understand the current RCA situation, we studied [112]
a sample of 377 reports from open field incident databases (in
aviation, automotive, rail, energy, and others) finding the
following:
1) RCAs in these reports were of poor quality, either because
they were not deep enough, economically or technically
infeasible, or inaccessible to us.
2) Particularly, root causes (e.g. software faults, specification
error) were rarely documented in a way that useful
information about the used technologies (e.g. software)
or about consequences in the development process could
be retrieved from the reports.
3) Reports in some sectors contain deeper RCAs (e.g.
aerospace, rail, power plants, process industry) than oth-
ers (e.g. automotive) because of different regulations.
4) Some sectors operate official databases (e.g. NHTSA10
and NTSB11 in the US transportation sector) and others
do not (e.g. German road transportation sector).
5) Our findings suggest that, even in domains with regulated
RCA, reports in open databases tend to be less informa-
tive than reports in closed databases.
6) The reports from the automotive industry exhibited a
relatively small fraction of technology-related errors (e.g.
software-related errors).
To validate our study and to better understand the context of
our findings, we performed seven semi-structured interviews
with safety practitioners [112], [47]. One takeaway was that,
because of an unclear separation of technologies and a lack of
explicit architectural knowledge, a desirable classification of
root causes is sometimes infeasible. Hence, accident analysts
can conclude their reports at a level of detail too low to draw
helpful conclusions. Additionally, one expert stated that the
hidden number of software-related or software-caused field
incidents in dependable systems practice is likely much larger
than the known number. This matches our intuition but we are
missing clear evidence.
Ladkin demands regulations to mandate the use of system-
atic RCAs.12 In support of his view, we believe that systematic
deep RCA (based on iFMs) can be helpful to gain clarity about
actual root causes. Again, beyond this undesirable form of late
error removal, such data is essential for the measurement of the
effectiveness of error removal techniques, particularly, iFMs.
The “Toyota unintended acceleration” incident [113] ex-
emplifies the difficulty of drawing conclusions without using
powerful RCA techniques: A first RCA concluded that floor
mats and sticky throttle pedals caused a fatal car mishap. A
second RCA carried out by NASA experts and based on testing
and automated static analysis of the control system (i.e.,
software and hardware) was not conclusive. A third RCA13
based on code reviews—we could not find out which level of
formal inspection (Appendix A) was used—detected defects
in the control software and safety architecture, demonstrated
to be likely the causes of the accident [113].
10National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, https://www.nhtsa.gov.
11National Transportation Safety Board, https://www.ntsb.gov.
12From personal communication.
13See expert interview by embedded software journalist from 2013 on
https://www.eetimes.com/document.asp?doc id=1319903&page number=1.
Opportunity 2: We could invest in the employment of
integrated formal methods for certifiable RAS assurance
to prevent field incidents, major product recalls, and
overly lengthy root cause investigations.
C. The Desire of Assurance to Form a Mature Discipline
In his Turing Award acceptance speech about 40 years ago,
Tony Hoare reviewed type safety precautions in programming
languages and concluded: “In any respectable branch of engi-
neering, failure to observe such elementary precautions would
have long been against the law” [114].
Inspired by this comparison, it can be helpful to look at
other engineering disciplines such as civil, mechanical, or
electrical engineering to identify transfer opportunities for
iFMs. There, engineers use FMs in many of their critical tasks.
However, nowadays these methods are often hidden behind
powerful software tools usable by qualified professional en-
gineers. However, we do not see such a high level of FM
adoption in dependable systems practice.
For example, in mechanical engineering, vocationally
trained engineers use computer-aided engineering, design,
and manufacturing software. Whether for designing machine
parts for serial production (i.e., specification) or for calcu-
lations (e.g. dimensioning, force or material flow simula-
tions), for these parts and their assembly (i.e., for prototype
verification), these engineers use tools based on canonical
mathematical models.
Nowadays, drawings from computer-aided mechanical de-
sign carry at least two types of semantics, one declarative
based on calculus for dimensioning (1), and one procedural
for the synthesis of Computer-Numerical-Control programs for
production machines processing materials to realise the draw-
ings (2). Note that the unifying base of these two semantics
is geometry, a well-studied mathematical discipline. Although
higher levels of complexity demand more sophisticated ana-
lytical expertise, typically from engineers with several years
of work experience, many tasks can be accomplished by less
trained engineers using the corresponding tools.
Whereas in computer-aided mechanical design both seman-
tics seem to be used to a similar extent, in DA we observe that
analogous semantics are rarely used even if tools are available,
and less often we see (1) and (2) being consistently used. Low
adoption might result from the semantics for dimensioning
and production automation being usually less abstract than the
semantics for verification (1) and synthesis (2) of computer
programs. Accordingly, Parnas suggests a shift from correct-
ness proof to property calculation to develop practical formal
methods [34, p. 33].
Patterns have had a long history in many disciplines. In
mechanical engineering, patterns are better known as machine
elements and are particularly useful in high-reliability appli-
cations. Machine elements (and standardised forms thereof)
have a stabilising impact on the outcome of an engineering
project. The process of element selection and composition
can take tremendous advantage not only from the reuse of
proven design knowledge but also from the reuse of complex
calculations (e.g. from gear transmissions, injection moulding
8tools, skeleton framings). Moreover, modern tools typically
foster the use of element libraries and parametric design.
Importantly, because the properties of such elements are in
many cases well known, calculations for assemblies (i.e.,
compositional verification) get relatively easy. However, the
higher the required precision of these calculations the more
expensive is their computation.
These observations are in line with what we know from col-
laborations in robotics, like mechatronics, a discipline where
many engineering domains have to play together well: FMs
are heavily used for the analysis of robot controllers and for
various kinds of simulations and tests [115], [116].
Digital circuit engineering is a domain where FMs such
as model checking have already been successfully applied
decades ago. However, systematic hardware errors, such as
Spectre and Meltdown, and the unavailability of temporal
specifications of highly optimised operations (e.g. branch-
prediction and speculative execution) discontinue the verifi-
ability of recent computer architectures. This lack of verifia-
bility of the assumptions (e.g. partitioning, information flow)
about the execution platform complicates the verifiability of
the software (e.g. an OS) running on such a platform.14
Opportunity 3: Dependability assurance has not yet
successfully adopted iFMs as a vital part of their key
methodologies. If FMs seem relatively well established
in other disciplines, we might also be able to successfully
transfer iFMs to RAS assurance and to dependability
engineering practice in other domains.
D. The Desire for Adequate and Dependable Norms
A striking finding in one of our recent discussions of
dependable systems standards (e.g. IEC 61508, ISO 26262,
DO-178C) is that normative parts for specification (i.e., re-
quirements engineering, RE), for specification validation (i.e.,
avoiding and handling requirements errors), and for hazard
and risk analysis (particularly, in early process stages) seem
to be below the state of the art [47], [103], despite several
observations that significant portions (e.g. 44% [117]) of the
causes of safety-critical software-related incidents fall into the
category of specification errors [118], [119].
The literature provides plenty of evidence of undesired
impacts of specification errors dating back as early as the
investigations of Lutz [120] and Endres [121]. As reported by
MacKenzie [108], the 92% of computer-related field incidents
caused by human-computer interaction also illustrate the gap
between specifications and capabilities of humans to interact
with automation. Despite these older figures, we are talking
of one of the most critical parts of standards. Practitioners
could expect to receive strong guidance from these parts and
requirements to show conformance to these parts should not
be vacuous.
Many standards define specific sets of requirements (i.e.,
for error removal and fault-tolerance) depending on the level
risk a system (or any part of it) might cause. The higher the
14See blog post on the seL4 microkernel,
https://research.csiro.au/tsblog/crisis-security-vs-performance/ .
risk level, the more demanding the allocated requirements,
for example, ASIL C-D, systematic capability 3-4, SIL 3-
4, Design Assurance Level A-B.15 Even for the highest such
levels the mentioned standards only “highly recommend” but
not mandate the use of FMs.
Guidelines for embedded software development such as
MISRA:1994 [122] recommend FMs for SIL 4, although
MISRA:2004 does no more include such information and
instead refers back16 to MISRA:1994. As already mentioned,
ISO 26262 as the overriding standard does not go beyond high
recommendation of FMs for SIL 4. Koopman [113] reports
in 2014 that, in the US, car manufacturers are not required
to follow the MISRA guidelines and that there are no other
software certification requirements. Note that this applies to
autonomous road vehicles as well.
As an interesting anecdote, Ladkin, a researcher involved in
the further development of IEC 61508, reports on his lack of
success in introducing systematic hazard (and risk) analysis
methodology into normative parts of this standard [123].
Moreover, he reports17 on unsuccessful attempts to strengthen
the role of FMs in IEC 61508 and on the “broken standardi-
sation” in assurance practice. In reaction to that, he proposes
the use of evidently independent peer reviews to “dampen
committee-capture by big-company bully players.”
Knight [119] complements: “There is an expectation by
the community that standards will embody the best available
technology and that their presentation will allow determination
of conformance to be fairly straightforward. A criticism that
is seldom heard is that some standards are, in fact, technically
flawed and poorly presented.” He exemplifies his critique by
several issues with IEC 61508 and RTCA DO-178B and sug-
gests to make the meaning of “conformance [or compliance]
with a standard” more rigorous. Particularly, he encourages
to replace indirect (i.e., process-related) evidence (e.g. doc-
umentation of specification activities) in assurance cases by
direct (i.e., artefact-related) evidence (e.g. unsuccessful checks
for presence of certain specification faults, successful checks
for absence of implementation errors).18 With the observation
in software quality control that “there is little evidence that
conformance to process standards guarantees good products,”
Kitchenham and Pfleeger [125] deliver a reasonable basis for
Knight’s suggestion.
Regarding the integration of dependability approaches and
FMs, Bowen and Stavridou [126] state already in 1993 that
they “do not know how to combine formal methods assurance
with metrics collected from other techniques such as fault-
tolerance.” Is this still an issue? From a practical viewpoint,
standards such as, for example, IEC 61508, ISO 26262, and
DO-178C, provide recommendations about techniques for the
reduction of both random hardware failures (e.g. by fault-
15Automotive Safety Integrity Level, Safety Integrity Level.
16This is likely also the case for MISRA:2012 from March 2013. We are
not aware of the opposite but also were not able to receive a copy of this
version.
17See System Safety Mailing List message from 4/11/2018,
http://www.systemsafetylist.org/4183.htm and [124].
18While formal verification serves the check of absence of property vio-
lations, conventional testing can only serve as a check of presence of such
violations.
9tolerance techniques) and systematic hardware and software
failures (e.g. by FMs, static analysis, and testing). If iFMs
can support the combined application of the recommended
techniques and achieve an improvement in practice then we
should really strive to demonstrate this.
We believe that critical fractions of strong direct evidence
can be delivered through the use of FMs. In support of
Feitelson’s argument [103], we see a strong opportunity for
an assessment of how the corresponding guidelines in these
standards can be extended and aligned with recent results in
FM research.
Opportunity 4: No more can we afford poorly regulated
and poorly certified high-risk software in a time where
dangerous autonomous machines are about to get widely
deployed in our society.
V. THREATS TO THE ADOPTION OF INTEGRATED FORMAL
METHODS IN ASSURANCE PRACTICE
This section closes the “environmental analysis” part of our
SWOT analysis by identifying potential threats to the success
of FM transfer as well as challenges that arise from alternative
or competing approaches taking the opportunities mentioned
in Section IV. We also hint to some remedies to these threats.
The development of effective iFMs and their successful
transfer into practice can be impeded by
• a lack of agreement on a sound semantic base for domain-
specific and cross-domain iFMs (Sections V-A and V-B),
• a missing support of widely used and established
tools (Section V-B),
• a lack of interest in practical problems on the side of FM
researchers (Section V-C),
• a lack of incentives for FM researchers to engage with
current practice and for software practitioners to engage
with recent theoretical results (Section V-C),
• a bad reputation among practitioners and applied re-
searchers (Section V-C),
• proofs that are faulty or do not scale (Section V-D),
• the quest for soundness overriding the quest for useful-
ness (Section V-E).
We discuss these threats and barriers in more detail in the
following.
A. Difficulties and Misconceptions of Unification
According to [95], the successes and failures of semi-formal
languages (e.g. UML or SysML) suggest that FMs, once
wrapped in FM-based tools, get exposed to the quest for a
unified syntax, one main objective of the UML movement in
the 1990s. Rather than a unified syntax, it is more desirable
to have a unified semantics and several well-defined mappings
to domain-specific syntax wherever convenient (Section III-E).
This approach is occasionally taken up by DSLs in MDE (Sec-
tion III-B). It has been argued [127] that one cannot achieve
proper integration of methods and notations without a unifying
semantics. This argument carries over to the problem of tool
integration as already discussed in Section III-E and revisited
below. Particularly, the following challenges apply to FMs
when used in MDE:
1) the maintenance of a single source of information serv-
ing in the (automated) derivation of downstream arte-
facts [128] (e.g. proof results, code via synthesis),
2) a clear mapping between the DSL presented to the
engineer (using intuitive notation) and the DSL semantics
serving as the basis of formal verification,
3) the embedding of a lean domain-specific formalism into
a common [129] data model suitable for access and
manipulation by engineers through their various [130]
tools.
These challenges are corroborated by irreducible unidirec-
tionalities in automated transformations (e.g. model-to-code)
limiting the desirable round-trip engineering [131] (i.e., the
change between views of the same data).
We discussed SACM as an assurance DSL in Section IV-A.
Likewise, architecture description languages (e.g. the Archi-
tecture Analysis & Design Language [132], EAST-ADL [133])
are DSLs for overall embedded system design. DSLs can be
seen as one shortcut to the still ongoing efforts of arriving at
a reduced version or a variant of UML where a semantics can
be defined for the whole language (e.g. [20]).
At a higher level of abstraction, so-called architecture
frameworks (cf. ISO 42010, e.g. the Department of Defense
Architecture Framework) and artefact and traceability mod-
els (e.g. [134], [135]) have been proposed, aiming at the
standardisation of specific parts of the systems and software
engineering life-cycle and of the documentation and data
models used there. These frameworks and models are similar
to the models used in product data/life-cycle management in
fields like mechanical or civil engineering.
To our best knowledge, no cross-disciplinary semantic uni-
fication has been undertaken yet (see Section III-E), serving as
a basis for dependable systems engineering. Although many
of these approaches have not been developed with the aim of
formalisation and the unification of semantics, we believe that
this effort has to be made when developing powerful iFMs.
FM integration and refinement-based software engineering
could be aligned with artefact models (see, e.g. [135], [136]),
particularly, because formal semantics can help establishing
traceability among the artefacts and handling traceability is-
sues in the engineering process (see, e.g. [137], [138]).
B. Reluctant Integration Culture and Legacy Processes
Tool integration is about the integration of engineering IT,
e.g. tools for requirements specification, computer-aided soft-
ware engineering, computer-aided mechanical design. Among
the wide variety of solutions to capture and track model data,
the majority deals with linking or merging data models [130]
in one or another shallow way (e.g. software repositories, data
exchange formats, product/engineering/application data or life-
cycle management systems).
Some tools with sustainable support are heavyweight, mak-
ing it difficult to agree on lean model semantics, others
are proprietary, accompanied with interest in hiding model
semantics. The surveys of Liebel et al. [96, pp. 102,104],
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Mohagheghi et al. [128, p. 104], and Akdur et al. [139] confirm
that method and model integration are not yet solved in MBD,
MDE, and dependable systems practice. Moreover, frequent
proposals by researchers (e.g. [17], [19], [20]) to formalise
the syntax and semantics of fragments or variants of UML and
SysML have not yet received wide attention by practitioners
and standardisation authorities.
However, modern DSL-based integrated development en-
vironments get close to what is suitable for FM-based tools
relying on a lean representation of the formal semantics
integrating the model data. For successful iFM transfer to
assurance practice, tools need to be built on a lean and open
central system model (see, e.g. [140], [141]).
An even greater barrier than loosely integrated tools are
legacy language and modelling paradigms, an established tool
and method market carried by legacy stakeholders and, possi-
bly, a neglected continuous improvement of FM education and
training. However, education through teaching and transfer
through training, application, and feedback are decisive.
C. Reluctant Transfer Culture and Exaggerated Scepticism
Finally, the vision of introducing iFMs into assurance prac-
tice might be hindered by a lack of FM researchers able
or willing to engage with industrial assurance practice, as
diagnosed in [21]. It is certainly hard work to collect sufficient
evidence for FM effectiveness in assurance practice because
of intellectual property rights and other legal issues but also
because of a lack of awareness [21] among FM researchers.
However, for credible method comparison experiments, Jones
and Bonsignour [45] recommend a sample of 20 similar
projects split into two groups, 10 projects without treat-
ment (i.e., not using FMs) and 10 projects with treatment (i.e.,
using FMs) to establish strong evidence (i.e., evidence of level
5 or above [23]).
Exaggerated scepticism on the side of practitioners and
applied researchers that has piled up through the years might
be one of the most important barriers to cross. Early failures
to meet too high expectations on FMs and FM transfer might
have led to what can be called an “FM Winter.” However, we
think crossing a few other barriers first might make it easier to
cope with scepticism in the assurance community and initiate
an “FM Spring” at least in assurance practice.
D. Too Many Errors in Proofs and Failure to Scale
From the perspective of measurement, Jones and Bon-
signour [45, Sec. 4.1] state that “proofs of correctness sound
useful, but [i] errors in the proofs themselves seem to be
common failings not covered by the literature. Further, large
applications may have thousands of provable algorithms, and
[ii] the time required to prove them all might take many years.”
For [i], the authors oppose 7% of erroneous bug repairs to up
to 100% of erroneous proofs, though stating that the latter is
based on an anecdote and there is little data around. Jones
and Bonsignour provide an example for [ii]: Assuming one
provable algorithm per 5 function points19 and on average
19A function point is a measure of the conceptual complexity of an IT
system relevant for the estimation of the amount of work required to engineer
this system.
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4 proofs per day, Microsoft Windows 7 (160,000 function
points) would have about 32,000 provable algorithms, taking
a qualified software engineer about 36 calendar years. They
highlight that typically only around 5% of the personnel
are trained to do this work, assuming that algorithms and
requirements are stable during proof time.
E. Failure to Derive Useful Tools
Being loosely related to erroneous proofs, the information
overload through false-positive findings of errors is a well-
known problem in static program analysis. Semi-formal pat-
tern checkers, such as PMD and FindBugs, are heavily exposed
to this threat [61]. Additionally, FM-based verification tools,
such as Terminator and ESC/Java [142], can also be unable
to correctly report all potential problems, because they are
bounded and, therefore, unsound. While such tools can be
very helpful, confronting developers with too many irrelevant
findings can lead to a decreased use of FM-based tools.
Figure 2 helps to relate the two information retrieval metrics
precision and recall with two adequacy criteria of proof
calculi, soundness and completeness. Completeness, although
unachievable for richer theories, would correspond to recall
and soundness would correspond to a precision of 1. On the
one hand, the usefulness of the calculi underlying FMs is
directly proportional only to their completeness and (tradi-
tionally) expires with a precision of < 1. On the other hand,
the usefulness of semi-formal pattern checkers leaves great
freedom as it is directly proportional to both precision and
recall of their findings. Practical tool usefulness might hence
lie somewhere in the middle between these two extremes.
VI. A VISION OF INTEGRATED FORMAL METHODS FOR
DEPENDABILITY ASSURANCE
The following discussion applies to many domains of de-
pendability assurance. However, the complexity of robots and
autonomous systems forms a key opportunity for the progress
of iFM research and for its successful transfer. Accordingly,
Table I summarises the discussion in Sections III to V with
an interpretation into RAS assurance practice. Based on the
strengths and opportunities described in Sections III and IV,
we formulate our vision in terms of working hypotheses:
1) From Section IV-A: Computer-assisted tools for the con-
struction of arguments and production of evidence using
iFMs can meet the challenge of assuring RAS safe.
Machine-checked assurance cases will greatly increase
confidence in their sufficiency, and also aid in their
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TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF OUR SWOT ANALYSIS (ACCORDING TO [31]) OF “IFMS IN PRACTICAL RAS ASSURANCE”
Method Strengths: iFMs raise the potential of . . .
• improvement of RAS models, specification of RAS requirements,
automation of RAS verification (Section III-A)
• early detection of systematic errors in RAS designs (Section III-A)
• integration and coordination of several FMs to consistently reason
about interrelated RAS aspects (Section III-E)
Community Strengths: iFM research can rely on . . .
• many transfer re-entry points from former RAS case studies in
industrial and academic labs (Section III-B)
• many assurance practitioners who perceive FM usefulness as posi-
tive (Section III-A)
Method Weaknesses: iFMs have been suffering from . . .
• being difficult to learn and apply, many assurance practitioners per-
ceive ease of use of FMs as negative (Section III-A)
• low effectiveness of formal models because of the reality gap (Sec-
tion III-D)
• fragile effectiveness and productivity in RAS engineering (Sec-
tion III-C)
Community Weaknesses: iFM progress has been hampered by . . .
• no agreed framework for integration of FMs (Section III-E)
• lack of convincing evidence of FM effectiveness in RAS engineer-
ing (Section III-C)
• research ineffectively communicated in iFM teaching/training (Sec-
tion III-A)
Key opportunities for iFM research transfer and progress:
• The desire for early removal of erroneous RAS behaviour and model-
based assurance (Section IV-A)
• The desire to learn from RAS accidents and their root causes (Sec-
tion IV-B)
• The desire of RAS assurance to be a mature discipline (Section IV-C)
• The desire for adequate and dependable RAS norms (Section IV-D)
Method Threats: iFM research could be threatened by . . .
• misconceptions of semantic unification in RAS practice (Section V-A)
• iFMs do not scale up to industry-size RAS applications (Section V-D)
• faulty, tedious, or vacuous proofs (Sections V-D and V-E)
• poor integration with RAS engineering tools and processes (Sec-
tion V-B)
Transfer Threats: iFM transfer could be threatened by a . . .
• lack of roboticists’ education in iFMs (Section V-B)
• lack of iFM researcher engagement in transfer to RAS practice (Sec-
tion V-C)
• lack of comprehensive access to quality data from RAS practice (Sec-
tion V-C)
maintenance and evolution through modularisation of
arguments and evidence.
2) From Sections IV-A and IV-C: iFMs, in particular modern
verification tools, will enable automation of the evidence
gathering process, and highlight potential problems when
an assurance case changes.
3) From Sections IV-A and IV-C: Moreover, there is no
stable path to assured autonomy without the use of iFMs.
Acceptable safety will be much more likely achieved with
iFMs than without their use.
4) From Section III-E: However, the success of iFMs de-
pends on the ability to integrate a variety of FMs for
different aspects of RAS (e.g. human-machine inter-
action, safety-security interaction, missing human fall-
back, environment/world modelling, uncertain predic-
tion/behaviour), which is not currently possible.
5) From Sections III-D and III-E: Sophisticated techniques
for model integration and synchronisation are necessary
to support MDE with iFMs. This way, iFMs will make
it easier to express consistent RAS models covering
all relevant aspects, make their modelling assumptions
explicit, and improve future assurance practices.
6) From Sections III-A to III-C and V-C: iFMs can be
beneficial in the short term. However, an important engi-
neering principle is to be conservative and, therefore, not
to change procedures unless there is compelling evidence
that iFMs are effective. Such evidence can be delivered
through empirical research (e.g. [42], [41], [21], [143]
on FMs in general) and collaboration between academia
and industry. Moreover, such evidence is required to
re-evaluate research and foster research progress and
transfer.
7) From Section IV-B: The demonstration of cost effective-
ness in addition to technical effectiveness of new iFM
research is necessary to justify further research progress.
8) From Section IV-D: Norms are a lever of public interest in
dependability [103]. Current norms seem to deviate from
the state of the art and may fail to guarantee product
certification procedures compliant with these interests.
Figure 3 assigns these hypotheses to the relationships
between foundational and transfer-directed iFM research by
example of the RAS application domain.
Overall, we believe that iFMs have great potential and are
believed to improve assurance but practitioners do not use
them accordingly.
Opportunity 5: We could take and enhance credible
measures to convince assurance practitioners of our
results and effectively transfer these results. For this to
happen, we have to answer further research questions.
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Fig. 3. Progress of research on integrated formal methods through transfer
into and improvement of assurance practice of robots and autonomous systems
12
VII. EMPIRICAL, APPLIED, AND FOUNDATIONAL
RESEARCH IN INTEGRATED FORMAL METHODS
Based on the aforementioned working hypotheses, we state
several objectives for foundational and transfer-directed iFM
research, formulate research questions, and show our expecta-
tions on desirable outcomes of such research.
A. Research Objectives and Tasks
To validate and transfer our research results, we need to
• re-evaluate how assurance case construction and manage-
ment for RAS can be improved by iFMs.
• debunk or justify arguments against the use of FMs or
FM-based tools in RAS assurance practice.
• foster successful FM research transfer to RAS industries
performing assurance and certification.
Taking an iFM foundational point of view, we need
• foundational research on integration and unification of
FMs to tackle the complexity of RAS [6].
• a unified semantic foundation for the plethora of notations
in RAS assurance, to enable method and tool integration.
There are currently a number of promising research
directions being undertaken here [13], [144].
Taking an evidence-based point of view (as already highlighted
in 1993 in [126]), we need to
• understand the difference between the state of assurance
practice and state of assurance research.
• understand in which ways current RAS assurance prac-
tices fail and suggest effective approaches from assurance
research. In this way, we can be sure that assurance
practice is equipped with state-of-the-art assurance tech-
nology for holding up against potential liability claims,
and assurance practitioners do not fail in fulfilling their
obligations.
• understand how results from assurance research can be
validated. In this way, we can be sure that assurance
research follows promising directions with high potential
of success in assurance practice.
Based on that, we need to
• set concrete directions for empirical FM research in RAS
assurance.
• train FM researchers in applying empirical research
designs in their research of rigorous assurance cases.
Woodcock et al. [21] corroborate this objective by saying
that “formal methods champions need to be aware of the
need to measure costs.”
• avoid biases as found in various branches of scientific
research, such as e.g. nutrition and medical sciences.
• increase the level of evidence of FM research to level 2
according to the hierarchy in [23, Tab. 2].
• avoid knowledge gaps about whether (a) RAS practice
is keeping up with state of the assurance art, and (b)
whether recent academic or industrial research is going
in the right directions. In this way, we can be sure that
we are doing our best to inform and serve the society.
Using appropriate research designs, we need to
• invite the RAS industry to enhance their efforts in engag-
ing with recent iFM research.
• foster goal-oriented interaction (a) between assurance
practitioners and researchers and (b) between the FM
researchers and assurance researchers. In this way, we
can be sure to do everything to keep FM and assurance
researchers up to date with respect to practical demands.
• join the FM research and applied assurance research
communities (Figure 1), both vital for the progress
and transfer of assurance research into RAS assurance
practice. This way, we can be sure to foster necessary
knowledge transfer between these two communities.
• further summarise achievements in practical application
of iFMs for constructing assurance cases.
• suggest improvements of curricula for RAS assurance.
• guide assurance and certification companies in process
improvement, training, and tool support.
• guide vendors of FM-based assurance tools to assess and
improve their tools and services.
B. Some Research Questions addressing these Objectives
The research questions below are relevant for FMs in
general. We consider these questions as crucial to be answered
for RAS assurance to address the aforementioned objectives:
1) What is the true extent of computer-related accidents up
to 2019 [108]? What would these figures mean for the
RAS domain?
2) Does the use of formalism detect severe errors to a larger
extent than without the use formalism [42], [41]?
3) Does the use of formalism detect severe errors earlier
than without using formalism?
4) Why would such errors be a compelling argument for the
use of FMs?
5) Apart from error avoidance and removal, which other
benefits of iFMs in practice are evident and can be utilised
for method trade-offs?
6) Beyond scalable FM-based tools, which other criteria
play a central role in measuring iFM effectiveness?
7) How would Commercial-off-the-Shelf and System-
Element-out-of-Context verification by iFMs pay off?
8) Which hurdles need to be overcome to use iFMs in
practice to the maximum benefit?
9) How do we know when these hurdles are actually over-
come?
10) How can FMs (from different disciplines) be used to-
gether (iFMs, unification)?
11) How can FMs be used to assure systems involving AI
techniques like machine learning, deep neural networks,
and computer vision?
12) How can FMs be integrated into assurance cases to sup-
port certification against international safety and security
standards?
13) How do we combine formal and informal methods?
14) How do we present formal requirements, evidence, and
artefacts in an assurance case?
15) How can empirical research help in successfully demon-
strating the capabilities of iFMs for rigorous and certifi-
able autonomy assurance?
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This list of research questions can easily be extended by
further more detailed empirical questions from the settings
discussed in [45, Sec. 4.4].
C. Envisaged Research Outcomes
Our vision of rigorous RAS assurance implies foundational
iFM research to result in:
• novel semantic frameworks unifying best practice meth-
ods, models, and formalisms established in RAS,
• new concepts for iFM-based development environments,
• new computational theories to support formal modelling
and verification of RAS
• evaluations of
– assurance tools, languages, frameworks, or platforms
used in practice regarding their support of iFMs
– the integration of iFMs into modelling and program-
ming techniques, assurance methods, and assurance
processes
– languages for linking informal requirements with evi-
dence from iFMs
– (automated) abstraction techniques used in assurance
and certification.
• opinions, positions, and visions on FM integration and
unification for rigorous practical assurance.
Our vision of rigorous RAS assurance implies applied and
empirical iFM research to result in:
• comparisons of
– projects applying iFMs in assurance practice with
similar practical projects applying non-iFM approaches
– iFM-based (embedded software) assurance with assur-
ance approaches in traditional engineering disciplines
• checklists, metrics, and benchmarks (for and beyond tool
performance) for
– the evaluation and comparison of iFM-based assurance
approaches (e.g. confidence level)
– relating error removal and incident root cause data (e.g.
efficiency and effectiveness in removal of severe errors
or in avoidance of severe accidents, cf. [108])
– usability and maturity assessment of iFMs (e.g. ab-
straction effort, proof complexity, assurance case com-
plexity, productivity)
– the evaluation of FM budget cases (cf. [145] in elec-
tronic hardware development).
• experiences in or surveys (e.g. systematic mappings and
reviews of assurance case research, interview studies with
assurance practitioners) of
– iFM transfers and applications (e.g. case studies in
assurance and certification projects)
– challenges, limitations/barriers, and benefits of iFMs in
assurance and certification projects,
• research designs (e.g. for controlled field experiments)
for the practical validation of iFMs in assurance and
certification projects
• opinions, positions, and visions on future research, edu-
cation, and training in FM-based assurance.
VIII. SUMMARY
Along the lines of Hoare et al. [8], we carried through an
analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
to determine the potential of integrated formal methods to
improve the practice of dependability assurance. From the
particular perspective of the robots and autonomous systems
domain, we outline several working hypotheses to express
our scientific vision. From these hypotheses, we derive a
research and research transfer agenda with the objective of
(i) enhancing the foundations of integrated formal methods,
(ii) collecting evidence on the effectiveness of integrated
formal methods in practice, (iii) successfully transferring in-
tegrated formal methods into the assurance practice of robots
and autonomous systems, and (iv) fostering research progress,
education, and training from the results of this transfer effort.
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APPENDIX
A. Formal Inspection versus Formal Methods in Practice
Formal Inspection (FI) encompasses a variety of tech-
niques (e.g. peer reviews, walk-throughs) where critical pro-
cess artefacts (e.g. program code) are checked (e.g. manually
or using software tools) against a variety of criteria (e.g. check-
lists), usually by a group of independent qualified engineers.
For sake of simplicity of the following discussion, we assume
that FMs can be seen as a particularly rigorous variant of
FI where formal specifications serve as a particular way of
formulating checklists.
Now, we compare the use of FMs with the use of FI. Ac-
cording to [45, Sec. 4.4], formal inspections are used in more
than 35% of commercial defence, systems, and embedded
software projects, and FMs are estimated to be applied in less
than 1% of overall commercial software engineering projects.
To get an idea of these coverage data, we perform an analysis
of the global embedded software market based on other global
software market indicators in Table II. We found estimates of
systems and software professionals world-wide and estimates
of annual US business values.20
A uniform distribution would entail roughly 37000
USD/year per person in the general software domain and
10000 USD/year per person in the embedded software domain.
Clearly, geographically strongly differing salaries and part-
time engagement rule out a uniform distribution, yet providing
figures helpful for our purposes.
Next, we apply the following proportions: From a world-
wide population of around 18.5 million software developers in
2014, about 19% live in the US, 10% in China, 9.8% in India,
36% Asia/Pacific region, 39 % live in Europe, the Middle East,
and Africa; and 30% in the Americas.21 The design to quality
assurance (i.e., verification and test) cost ratio is observed
to be approximately 30 : 70.22 About 20% of embedded
software personnel are quality assurance engineers (i.e., test,
verification, or validation engineers).23
The estimates in Table II suggest that around 2% of the
overall pure software market are allocated to the embedded
pure software market. 35% coverage of formal inspection
in about 13.5% of the overall software market (161/(689 +
515) = 0.134) would result in roughly 4.7% coverage of
all software projects by formal inspection versus at most 1%
coverage by FMs. However, from these data we can hardly
know whether rates of FM use get close to or beyond 10% in
high-criticality systems projects.
Assuming that in about 35% of embedded software projects
the quality assurance personnel would use formal inspection
and that in every fifth (1 : 4.7) of such projects formal
methods would be used, the current population of regular
practical FM users would globally amount to about 5040 (=
72, 000 ∗ 0.34 ∗ 0.20) persons. Note that these numbers are
rough estimates. However, we believe their order of magnitude
is realistic. Moreover, given that these persons would on
average earn about 100,000 USD/year each, we would speak
of round USD 504 million of annual business value.
Importantly, from these data we can determine minimum
sample sizes for surveys. For example, assume we want to
have 95% confidence in our test results and are fine with a
20See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software industry and
https://softwareengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/18959/what-proportion-of-programm
21See https://adtmag.com/Blogs/WatersWorks/2014/01/Worldwide-Developer-Count.aspx.
22See https://www.slideshare.net/pboulet/socdesign.
23See https://de.slideshare.net/vdcresearch/searching-for-the-total-size-of-the-embedded-so
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TABLE II
DATA FOR THE ESTIMATION OF THE SIZE OF THE FORMAL INSPECTION AND FORMAL METHOD MARKET
Global market/project indicators
[Unit]
Professional en-
gineers / develop-
ers [million]
Ann. business
value [billion
USD/year]
Quality assur-
ance personnel
[million]
QA business
value [billion
USD/year]
FI [%] FM [%] Devices
[billion/year]
General IT hardware and devices
(incl. personal computers)
2018: 689 2010: 10
Embedded systems (hardware,
software, connected embedded
devices) in all domains
2014: 1.2 2009: 88
2018: (161)a
(35) 2010: 9.8
Industrial embedded systems 2016: 2
Defence, systems, and embedded
commercial software engineering
2011: 35
Embedded software 2014: 0.36 2009: 3.4
2018: (10)
2010: (0.072) 2010: (2.38)
General software (overall commer-
cial software engineering)
2014: 11
US: 2.1 (19%)
2013: 407
2018: (515)
(4.6) 2011: 1
aThe numbers in parentheses include estimates for 2018 based on the other numbers and corresponding average growth rates.
TABLE III
OVERVIEW OF OUR GENERAL SWOT ANALYSIS (ACCORDING TO [31]) OF “FMS FOR PRACTICAL DEPENDABILITY ASSURANCE”
Method Strengths:
• Improvement of modelling precision, requirements clarity, verification
confidence
• High error detection effectiveness, early error removal
Community Strengths:
• Many transfer re-entry points from former case studies with industry
• Many dependable systems practitioners perceive FM usefulness as
positive
Method Weaknesses:
• Difficult to learn and apply, many dependable systems practitioners
perceive ease of use of FMs as negative
• Fragile effectiveness and productivity
Community Weaknesses:
• Lack of compelling evidence of FM effectiveness
• Ineffectively communicated in teaching and training
Key Opportunities for iFM Transfer and Research Progress:
• Desire for early removal of severe errors (Section IV-A)
• Desire to learn from accidents and their root causes (Section IV-B)
• Desire to be a mature discipline (Section IV-C)
• Desire for dependable norms (Section IV-D)
Method Threats:
• Lack of method scalability
• Faulty, tedious, or vacuous proofs
• Lack of user education
• Poor tool integration, legacy tools and processes
Transfer Threats:
• Lack of researcher engagement in FM transfer
• Lack of access to comprehensive high-quality data
confidence interval of ±7%. Then, for regular practical FM
users, a population of the size of 5040 persons would require
us to sample 189 independent data points (e.g. questionnaire
responses). The population of regular practical FI users,
25200 (= 72, 000 ∗ .35) would imply a minimum sample
size of 194. For any sample of such size, any survey has to
argue why the sample represents the population. This step
depends on the possibilities given during the sampling stage.
Obviously, reaching out to 189 out of 5040 persons whose
locations might be largely unknown is an extremely difficult
task that might only be tackled in terms of a global group
effort among researchers. Overall, these figures suggest that
it is realistic to run surveys for the collection of confident
evidence.
B. Formal Methods for Dependable Systems Practice
As depicted in Figure 1, Table III provides a more general
SWOT analysis than the one shown in Table I.
